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The Right to a Jury Trial in Actions for 
Patent Infringement and Suits for 
Declaratory Judgment 
Brian D. Coggio 
Timothy E. DeMasi* 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether a case is tried before a jury significantly affects the 
patentees (and conversely, the alleged infringers) likelihood of 
success.1  Accordingly, both parties are entitled to know 
definitively when a Seventh Amendment2 right to a jury trial 
exists.3  Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
has not provided clear guidance on this question, and the few 
decisions on point, while applying the same constitutional analysis, 
 
* Mr. Coggio is a partner in the New York City office of Orrick, Herrington & 
Sutcliffe LLP.  Mr. DeMasi is a partner in the New York City office of Pennie & 
Edmonds LLP.  The authors wish to thank Kristin Smith, a 2002 summer associate at 
Pennie & Edmonds, for her assistance in the preparation of this Article.  The views 
expressed herein are solely those of the authors.  This Article does not express the views 
of the firms of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP or Pennie & Edmonds LLP, or any 
lawyer or client of either firm. 
1 See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent CasesAn Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000). 
2 The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for the right to a 
jury trial in suits at common law.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also James Fleming, Jr., 
Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963); infra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
3 See generally Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Courts 
Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183 (2000); Greg 
J. Michelson, Did the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and the Spirit of the 
Constitution in Its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1749 (1997); Allen 
N. Littman, The Jurys Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: Markman, 
Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207 (1997); Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do 
Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623 
(1996). 
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have reached inconsistent results.4  The court first examined the 
right to a jury trial in In re Lockwood5 and more recently in Tegal 
Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.6  In both opinions, the court 
began by discussing the Supreme Courts test for determining if a 
right to a jury attaches to an action.  According to the Federal 
Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that the right to a jury 
depends on both the nature of the action and the remedy sought.7  
With respect to statutory patent actions, the court further observed 
that the analysis has two steps: First, we compare the statutory 
action to 18th century actions brought in the courts of England 
prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.  Second, we 
examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or 
equitable in nature.8 
In eighteenth century England, claims of patent infringement 
could be raised in actions at law or in suits in equity.9  Where a 
patentee sought only damages, the patentee brought an action at 
law and the action was tried before a jury.10  If, on the other hand, 
a patentee sought only to enjoin acts of infringement, the patentee 
could only bring a suit in equity.11  In that latter instance, the 
action would be tried before the bench.12  The court noted that 
nineteenth century American practice followed the same basic 
 
4 In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines v. 
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (holding plaintiff patentee is entitled to have the issue 
of validity tried to a jury as a matter of right); Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 
257 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding no right to jury trial where equitable relief 
requested and only affirmative defenses raised); In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (nonprecedential opinion) (also holding 
plaintiff patentee is entitled to have the issue of validity tried to a jury as a matter of 
right). See generally Brian D. Coggio & Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a Jury Trial 
Under The Waxman-Hatch Act: The Question Revisited and Resolved, 57 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 155 (2002). 
5 50 F.3d at 966. 
6 257 F.3d at 1331. 
7 See id. at 1339; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972. 
8 Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972 (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 
565 (1990) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 41718 (1987))); see also Tegal, 
257 F.3d at 133941. 
9 Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976. 
10 Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976. 
11 Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976. 
12 Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976. 
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pattern.13  Thus, under both English and American practice, it was 
the patentee who decided whether a jury would be permitted by the 
nature of the remedy sought.14 
The same result should apply today: The right to a jury trial 
should be determined by the patentees choice of remedy.  When a 
patentee sues for infringement and seeks damages, the case may be 
tried before a jury.  However, if a patentee either has no claim for 
damages or foregoes that claim, no right to a jury exists, even if the 
defendant interposes counterclaims seeking declarations of 
invalidity and non-infringement.  Lastly, because a declaratory 
judgment suit is simply an inversion of a patent infringement 
action,15 the same result should apply.  If a patentee asserts an 
infringement counterclaim seeking damages, the case may be tried 
to a jury; if the patentee either cannot or does not seek damages, 
the case must be heard by a court.16 
This Article addresses various situations that arise in typical 
patent disputes.  Part I briefly examines Seventh Amendment 
jurisprudence and the historical interpretation of the right to a jury 
trial.  Part II explores patent infringement actions where damages 
are unavailable and concludes that, in those situations, there is no 
right to a jury trial.17  Part III analyzes Seventh Amendment rights 
 
13 Id. 
14 See Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1341 (As for the second step of the analysis, the court 
observed that an injunction is a purely equitable remedy.). 
15 Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980. 
16 The court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose 
verdict will have the same effect as if the trial by jury had been a matter of right. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 39(c). 
17 See Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 00-C5791, 2001 WL 1246628, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2001) (striking defendants jury request because an action instituted 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act is equitable in nature); Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 
00-C1475, 2001 WL 477163, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001) (declining to find a Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in Hatch-Waxman actions).  Although certain cases 
supporting the authors conclusion were decided under the Hatch-Waxman Act, these 
decisions are instructive on the right to a jury trial in more typical actions for patent 
infringement. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68bc, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 301 note 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 
(1994)). See also Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., No. 02-C2255, 2002 WL 1917871 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2002) (stating that the Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the issue 
of a right to a jury trial where the counterclaims arise in Hatch-Waxman cases, but 
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in  patent infringement actions where damages are available but 
not sought, and no counterclaims are asserted, and concludes that 
the parties are not entitled to a jury absent a claim for damages.  
Part IV concludes that the assertion of a declaratory judgment 
counterclaim in a patent infringement action does not affect the 
right to a jury.  Part V analyzes suits for declaratory judgments and 
concludes that the right to a jury trial is again determined by the 
patentees choice of remedy.18 
I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT IS LIMITED TO ACTIONS AT LAW 
In civil actions, including those involving patents, the right to a 
jury trial is controlled by the constitutional mandate of the Seventh 
Amendment.19  Limiting its application to suits at common 
law,20 the Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial for those 
 
holding that such counterclaims do not give rise to a right to a jury trial.); Brian D. 
Coggio & Sandra A. Bresnick, The Right to a Jury Trial Under the Waxman-Hatch Act, 
52 FOOD & DRUG  L.J. 259 (1997). 
18 In analyzing the right to a jury trial, the authors recognize that the Supreme Court in 
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 
369 U.S. 469 (1962) reversed the earlier rule that an action that sought both monetary 
damages and equitable relief was predominantly equitable and therefore was not tried to a 
jury. See also 5 MARTIN L. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 7.6[2.-1] (1996). See 
generally Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 98090 (Nies, J., dissenting); Tights Inc. v. Stanley, 441 
F.2d 336, 34144 (4th Cir. 1971); Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 125253 (3d 
Cir. 1969).  Moreover, the present analysis intentionally avoids discussion of the writ of 
scire facis as well as the public rights and the issue of law exceptions to the Seventh 
Amendment as unnecessary to the authors ultimate conclusions. 
19 Specifically, the Seventh Amendment provides: In suits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of common law.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
20 Id. 
The phrase common law, found in [the Seventh Amendment], is used in 
contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence . . . .  By 
common law, [the Seventh Amendments framers] meant what the constitution 
denominated in the third article law; not merely suits, which the common law 
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal 
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those 
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were 
administered . . . .  In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed 
to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, 
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actions that in 1971 created legal rights and remedies enforceable 
in a court of law.21  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure echo the 
Seventh Amendments instruction, reiterating the parties right to a 
jury trial of all issues unless the court finds that a right of trial by 
jury of some or all of those issues does not exist under the 
Constitution or statutes of the United States.22  In short, the scope 
of the Seventh Amendment extends only to the adjudication of 
legal, not equitable, rights.23  As a result, parties to patent 
infringement actions cannot insist upon a trial by jury absent a 
claim that seeks legal relief.24 
Given that the Seventh Amendment embraces only actions 
based on legal rights and remedies, issues must be characterized as 
either legal or equitable before a jury trial is allowed.  To 
determine whether a claim presents legal rights for a jurys 
determination or equitable rights for the courts review, two 
specific factors are evaluated.25  First, the pending action is 
 
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal 
rights. 
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 44647 (1830) (emphasis added). 
21 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 19395 (1974) (holding that a court must honor a 
partys jury demand where factual issues concerning legal rights and remedies require a 
trial). See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 38283 (1974) (holding that 
where an action involves rights and remedies recognized at common law, the parties 
right to a jury trial must be preserved). 
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(2). 
23 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). 
24 But see 28 U.S.C. §§ 211216 (repealed 1982) (trial of issues of fact in equity in 
patent causes).  By way of illustration, the use of juries in patent-related claims has 
developed significantly since this statute, quoted below, was applicable: 
District courts, when sitting in equity for the trial of patent causes, may impanel 
a jury of not less than five and not more than twelve persons, subject to such 
general rules in the premises as may, from time to time, be made by the 
Supreme Court, and submit to them such questions of fact arising in such cause 
as such district court shall deem expedient and the verdict of such jury shall be 
treated and proceeded upon in the same manner and with the same effect as in 
the case of issues sent from chancery to a court of law and returned with such 
findings. 
Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 77, § 2, 18 Stat. 316. 
25 The Court blurred the dual nature of this historical test in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), and overlooked all references to the tests remedy 
prong.  Nevertheless, the Markman Courts analysis specifically noted a prior decision 
that properly cited both factors of the historical test. Id. at 377 (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 
426). 
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equated to its closest eighteenth century analog brought in courts 
of England26 prior to the merger of law and equity.27  Second, the 
requested relief is analyzed and classified as either legal or 
equitable.28  The nature of the requested relief is widely viewed as 
the more important of the two criteria.29  In addition, where neither 
a precise historical analog can be ascertained nor the available 
precedent be applied to the claims at issue, the limited abilities of 
juries may also be scrutinized.30 
Despite its seemingly straightforward inquiry, application of 
this two-part test has proven more difficult than one might have 
envisioned.  For example, the merger of courts of law and equity in 
the early 1930s complicated the analysis considerably.  After the 
merger, courts were presented with cases combining related claims 
for legal and equitable relief, creating confusion as to where legal 
and equitable claims diverged, if at all.  In an attempt to clarify the 
mandate of the historical test, the Supreme Court opined that the 
nature of the issues controlled the nature of the underlying action 
and if both legal and equitable issues were present, a jury trial, was 
 
26 Much like today, in eighteenth century England, a plaintiff patentee was the master 
of both the choice of forum and nature of the remedy in patent infringement actions.  
Specifically, depending on the remedy requested, allegations of patent infringement could 
be raised either in actions at law or in suits in equity.  Thus, if the patentee sought only 
monetary relief, the patentee would bring an action at law.  Then, where requested, 
affirmative defenses of invalidity were assessed by a jury. See Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. 
75 (17 How.) 74 (1854).  Conversely, where a plaintiff patentee, faced with only past acts 
of infringement, sought to enjoin future infringement, the patentee could only bring suit 
in equity.  Under these circumstances, the affirmative defense of invalidity was 
traditionally tried to the bench. See Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189, 20506 (1881). 
27 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 19394 (1974). 
28 See id. 
29 See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Tull, 481 U.S. at 
421 (characterizing the requested relief as [m]ore important than finding a precisely 
analogous common-law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment 
guarantees a jury trial. (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196)). 
30 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 38890; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 
42 n.4 (1989) (listing practical abilities and limitations of juries as an additional factor to 
be consulted in determining whether the Seventh Amendment conveys a right to a jury 
trial); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (including the practical abilities 
and limitations of juries among the factors of consideration when applying the historical 
test). 
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if requested, mandatory.31  Soon after, the Court further extended 
the right to a jury trial for legal issues once considered merely 
incidental to equitable claims and held that the jury trial must 
precede a trial of related issues to the bench.32 
The development of civil actions unknown at common law and 
thus considered neither legal nor equitable in nature only added to 
the complexities (and confusion) concerning the right to a jury 
trial.  The advent of the declaratory judgment action, for example, 
provided accused infringers with a procedural defense to a 
patentees charge of infringement and provided courts with yet 
another type of action to classify under the legal-equitable rubric.  
Ultimately, courts concluded that the filing of a declaratory 
judgment action seeking an equitable remedy prior to the assertion 
of legal counterclaims does not eliminate the Seventh Amendment 
right to have legal claims tried by a jury.33  The difficult question 
remained, however: What are legal claims that can be tried to a 
jury?  The following sections address typical scenarios that arise in 
patent disputes, providing a simple, straightforward solution to this 
complex problem. 
II. WHERE A PATENTEE HAS A RIGHT ONLY TO EQUITABLE RELIEF, 
THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
An action in which an accused infringer sought a declaratory 
judgment of invalidity  and the patentee  counterclaimed for only a 
permanent injunction against threatened infringement, Shubin v. 
United States District Court,34 necessitated the Ninth Circuits 
review of the right to a jury trial in a patent case lacking a request 
 
31 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (reasoning that in 
cases requesting both legal and equitable relief in addition to a jury trial on legal claims, 
all issues common to both types of claims were first to be tried to a jury). 
32 See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 n.8 (1962) (As long as any legal 
cause is involved the jury rights it creates control.). 
33 See Barry S. Wilson, Patent Invalidity and the Seventh Amendment: Is the Jury Out?, 
34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787, 1800 (1997) (Filing a declaratory judgment for an 
equitable action prior to filing legal counterclaims does not eliminate the . . . right to have 
a jury decide the legal claims.  (citing Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504)). 
34 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963). 
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for monetary damages.35  After examining the pleadings, the court 
emphasized that the patentee neither specified a damages amount 
nor suffered any actual infringement upon which damages could 
have been based.36  With only threatened infringement asserted, 
the court found that no possibility [existed] that damages could be 
awarded, or that an accounting could become necessary or 
possible.37  Consequently, absent a claim for damages, the action 
was equitable and only afforded the patentee the possibility of an 
equitable remedy.38  As a result, the Shubin court held that the 
patentee, presenting a purely equitable claim,39 was not entitled 
to a jury trial on either the accused infringers or the patentees 
declaratory judgment claims.40 
The Ninth Circuits analysis of the patentees claim underlines 
the authors ultimate conclusion that the right to a jury trial in 
 
35 See id. at 250. 
36 See id. at 251.  The Shubin court did not fail to recognize that a legal issue triable 
before a jury could very well exist in an action in which a patentee claimed damages for 
infringement, noting that [i]f we examine the pleadings before us alone, they indicate 
that there could exist an issue at law, i.e., damage for infringement. Id. (emphasis 
added).  The case, however, as emphasized by the Shubin court, differed in that [n]o 
amount of damage [was] specified, and no prayer for damages in any amount was 
asserted. Id. See also Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d 
Cir. 1942) (reiterating that on issues of patent infringement, a jury trial may be had 
under a claim for damages only, as distinguished from a claim for injunction and 
accounting of profits) (citations omitted). 
37 Shubin, 313 F.2d at 251.  In short, because the parties stipulated that infringement 
had yet to occur, the patentee could not have sought damages.  However, if instances of 
actual infringement were to occur during the course of the proceedings, the patentee 
could later assert a claim for damages, thus entitling him or her to a trial by jury.  For 
example, in Beaunit Mills, the Second Circuit opined that where an equitable action later 
develops legal issues, the question of jury trial will have to be determined in the light of 
the then status of the case. 124 F.2d at 566. See also infra Part III (discussing the 
evolving legal and equitable claims in Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 257 
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and their effect on the parties right to a jury trial). 
38 The court succinctly illustrated this position, and clearly characterized the patentees 
cause of action, explaining: [D]efendants seek only a permanent injunction against 
threatened infringement.  This is not a legal issue.  Defendants only remedy would be in 
equity.  Shubin, 313 F.2d at 251 (emphasis added). See also Beaunit Mills, 124 F.2d at 
565 (approving the trial judges denial of a jury trial where the claim is framed along 
equitable lines looking to injunctive relief and presenting equitable issues only). 
39 Shubin, 313 F.2d at 252. 
40 See id.  The Shubin decision also supports the authors opinion that the right to a jury 
trial in declaratory judgment actions depends solely on the nature of the relief requested 
by the patentee. See also infra Part V. 
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typical patent disputes lies within the sole control of the patentee.  
For example, the Shubin court analyzed the sort of action the 
defendant patentee could have brought at common law41 to 
determine the right to a jury trial and found that the patentees 
claims were firmly rooted in equity.  Because the patentee did not 
and, in fact, could not seek monetary damages, the action was 
purely equitable, and the patentee therefore was not entitled to 
jury.42 
Following the reasoning of Shubin, the Federal Circuit in 
Lockwood, discussed below, similarly concentrated on the type of 
action the patentee could have brought at common law.43  The 
Lockwood court specifically noted that both parties in Shubin 
stipulated that no infringement had occurred, significantly limiting 
the patentees possible relief.44  Indeed, the Federal Circuit insisted 
that Shubin was easily distinguished from Lockwood because no 
claim for damages could have been brought by the patentee in 
Shubin.45 
The previous statement shows the Federal Circuits 
endorsement of the conclusion that where a patentee has no right to 
monetary damages, it is not entitled to a jury.  Accordingly, the 
decisions of other circuit courts that equitable claims do not 
provide a right to trial by jury, coupled with the imprimatur of the 
Federal Circuit, support the authors conclusion.  Indeed, various 
district courts have held that the lack of damages in actions 
instituted under the Hatch-Waxman Act negates the possibility of a 
 
41 Shubin, 313 F.2d at 250. 
42 See Shubin, 313 F.2d at 25152; Filmon Process Corp. v. Sirica, 379 F.2d 449, 451 
(D.C. Cir. 1967). 
43 See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 977 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines 
v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). 
44 Id.  In Lockwood, the Federal Circuit emphasized that, in Shubin, the patentees 
counterclaim for a permanent injunction against future infringement, paired with its 
stipulation to the absence of any claim for infringement damages, convinced the court 
that the issues in the case were purely equitable ones. Id. (discussing Shubin, 313 F.2d at 
250). 
45 Id. (emphasis added).  In contrast, the Lockwood patentee could have sought (and did 
seek) both monetary and equitable relief. See id. at 968.  Thus, Lockwood instituted a 
legal action and requested a jury trial. 
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jury trial.46  In sum, where a patentee is only entitled to equitable 
relief, that patentee (or its adversary) is not entitled to a jury. 
III. WHERE A PATENTEE DOES NOT SEEK MONETARY DAMAGES 
AND COUNTERCLAIMS OF INVALIDITY OR NON-INFRINGEMENT ARE 
NOT ASSERTED, THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL  
In Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.,47 the Federal 
Circuit held that where the patentee sought only injunctive relief 
(although damages were available) and the defendant did not assert 
counterclaims, neither party had a right to a jury trial.48  There, the 
patentee, Tegal, sued Tokyo Electron American, Inc. (TEA) for 
patent infringement, sought both damages and an injunction, and 
requested a jury.49  TEA asserted affirmative defenses of invalidity 
and non-infringement, but did not counterclaim.50  Six days before 
trial, Tegal dropped its request for damages with the understanding 
that by withdrawing its damages claim, it would lose its right to a 
trial by jury.51 Tegal then moved to withdraw its request for a jury 
trial, which TEA opposed.  The district court agreed with Tegal, 
holding that a right to a jury trial no longer existed.52 
 
46 See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 00 C 1475, 2001 WL 477163, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001); Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., No. 99-2181, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20718, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2000); Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1703 (D.N.J. 1997). See generally Brian D. Coggio & 
Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a Jury Trial Under The Waxman-Hatch Act: The 
Question Revisited and Resolved, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 155 (2002). 
47 257 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
48 The authors submit that Tegal casts doubt on the continuing validity of Lockwood. 
Accord 5 ADELMAN, supra note 18, § 7.6[2.-1]18, at 7-218.35 (noting that [Tegal] is 
squarely contrary to the Federal Circuits holding in Lockwood). 
49 See Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1338. 
50 The defendants failure to assert any counterclaims was apparently significant to the 
Federal Circuit in that this fact is repeated throughout the Tegal opinion.  The courts 
emphasis of the lack of counterclaims made it possible, at least implicitly, to distinguish 
Lockwood. 
51 Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1338. 
52 Id.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that [a] demand for trial by jury 
made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 38(d).  Thus, TEA argued that Tegal could not withdraw its request.  The 
Federal Circuit recognized, however, that Tegal did not merely withdraw its request for a 
jury trial, but, by withdrawing its claim for monetary damages, Tegal destroyed the 
constitutional basis for the right of either party to request a jury. Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1338. 
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that a 
defendant that asserts only affirmative defenses does not have a 
right to a jury trial where the patentee seeks only an injunction.53 
The opinion is significant for various reasons.  First, it would 
appear that in Tegal, the plaintiff, unlike the cases discussed in the 
prior section, had a right to damages, but voluntarily waived that 
right.  Thus, the courts decision implicitly recognized that the 
patentees choice of remedy controlled both parties right to a jury 
trial (at least where no counterclaims were asserted).  Second, the 
wording of the Federal Circuits opinion suggests that Tegal 
withdrew its damages claim to avoid a jury trial.  Again, this 
emphasizes that the patentee, regardless of its motives, dictates the 
ultimate trier of fact.  Third, the court recognized that the issue of 
patent validity, although classified as legal, did not necessarily 
require a jury trial.54 
The Federal Circuit based its analysis on Lockwood, finding 
that even though that opinion had been vacated by the Supreme 
Court55 its reasoning was still pertinent.  Relevant to the issue in 
Tegal was Lockwoods explanation that [i]n eighteenth century 
England, allegations of patent infringement could be raised in both 
actions at law and suits in equity, and that the choice of forum 
depended on the type of remedy sought by the patentee.56 This, in 
turn, controlled the right to a jury trial. If an injunction were 
sought, the patentee filed suit in a court of equity; conversely, if 
the patentee sought damages, the action was filed in a court of law.  
Applying that framework to the facts in Tegal, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that because Tegal sought only an injunction, in 
eighteenth century England, it would have been required to bring 
its suit in equity.  Thus, neither party had a right to a jury.57 
 
53 Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1341. 
54 Contra In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (nonprecedential opinion). See 5 ADELMAN, supra note 18, § 7.6[2.-1], at 7-218.34. 
55 Since Lockwood was vacated, its precedential value had been eliminated. See L.A. 
County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979); OConnor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
57778 n.12 (1975); W.Y. Moberly, Inc. v. United States, 924 F.2d 232, 236 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
56 Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340 (quoting Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976). 
57 Id. at 1341. 
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In Tegal, the Federal Circuit repeatedly distinguished 
affirmative defenses of invalidity and non-infringement from 
counterclaims seeking the same relief.58 The authors do not discern 
any difference between the two for purposes of a Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.59 Nor does Tegal articulate any 
such difference.60 In fact, in its original (but later vacated) 
Lockwood decision, the Federal Circuit held that a right to a jury 
trial existed because the action sought damages for patent 
infringement, a legal remedy based on legal rights.61 More 
significantly, however, the court stated that the existence of a 
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity does not 
alter the nature of the issues, rights or the remedy sought in the 
infringement suit brought by Lockwood.62 In its second 
Lockwood decision, the Federal Circuit altered its views and 
concluded that the existence of a counterclaim for invalidity does 
alter the nature of the case and the right to a jury trial.63  The 
authors respectfully disagree. 
 
58 See id. at 1339, 1341.  Interestingly, in its original decision in In re Lockwood, 30 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292, 1293 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished), the Federal Circuit 
noted that the defendants declaratory judgment counterclaim adopted all of the grounds 
for invalidity pled as defenses to Lockwoods infringement suit.  This would indicate 
that the nature of the case to be adjudicated did not change by denoting affirmative 
defenses as counterclaims. 
59 See Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 00 C 5791, 2001 WL 1246628, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2001) (The mere fact that invalidity has been raised in a counterclaim 
rather than in an affirmative defense does nothing to change this characterization.).  For 
further analysis of declaratory judgment actions, see infra Part V. 
60 The Tegal courts emphasis on the remedy sought by the patentee supports the 
authors views, discussed in Part V, infra, regarding declaratory judgment actions.  
Indeed, it would have been instructive had the Federal Circuit articulated even one reason 
why the presence or absence of counterclaims for declarations of invalidity or non-
infringement (which did not exist at common law) dramatically changed the analysis and, 
in fact, changed the result in Tegal from that in Lockwood. 
61 Lockwood, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
62 Id. (emphasis added). 
63 In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines v. 
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). 
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IV. WHERE A PATENTEE DOES NOT SEEK MONETARY DAMAGES, 
THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, EVEN WHERE 
COUNTERCLAIMS SEEKING DECLARATIONS OF INVALIDITY AND 
NON-INFRINGEMENT ARE ASSERTED 
The authors realize that their conclusion on this issue is 
contradicted by the Federal Circuits decisions in Lockwood and 
SGS-Thomson.64  The authors respectfully submit that both 
opinions are incorrect.  While a brief summary of both decisions is 
helpful, it is instructive to begin by reviewing the role of 
declaratory judgment counterclaims in patent infringement 
litigation, a key to a proper understanding of Lockwood. 
To some extent, the benefits of declaratory judgment 
counterclaims mirror the benefits of the declaratory judgment 
procedure.  Professor Borchard acknowledged the utility of such 
counterclaims in a section of his treatise entitled Counterclaims: 
Reference has been made to one of the great evils that had 
clustered around the patent monopoly in the form of the 
opportunity afforded to the patentee to harass competitors, 
alleged infringers and their customers by threatening to sue 
or actually suing and then moving to dismiss any time 
before trial, leaving his claims under the patent 
unadjudicated.  Yet the infringer had no opportunity to 
insist on adjudication until 1934, when the action for a 
declaratory judgment of invalidity or non-infringement 
afforded him a remedy.  Patentees actually commencing an 
infringement suit can furthermore now be prevented from 
arbitrarily discontinuing, provided the defendant files a 
petition for a counterclaim of invalidity or non-
infringement, a pleading which insures an adjudication 
even should the plaintiff patentee move to dismiss.65 
Thus, a patentees threat of suit could be redressed by instituting an 
action for a declaratory judgment of invalidity or non-
infringement.  Moreover, if a patentee commences an infringement 
 
64 But see Glaxo Group, 2001 WL 1246628, at *5 (The mere fact that invalidity has 
been raised in a counterclaim rather than in an affirmative defense does nothing to change 
this characterization [of the right to a jury trial].). 
65 EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 812 (2d ed. 1941). 
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action, the assertion of a counterclaim, as opposed to mere 
affirmative defenses, would prevent the patentee from dismissing 
the case and reinstituting the action at a later date.66  Despite the 
protections of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) regarding 
voluntary dismissals,67 declaratory judgment counterclaims still 
protect the accused infringer from abuses by the patentee.68  Yet, it 
has been recognized that counterclaims seeking only a declaratory 
judgment that the patent is invalid and uninfringed . . . would not, 
of itself, entitle either party to a jury trial of the issues.69 
As such, a counterclaim for invalidity or non-infringement 
does not affect the nature of the action in any way except to 
prevent the matter from remaining undecided if a plaintiff-patentee 
withdraws the suit.70  The counterclaim, in this context, does not 
contribute a new or additional issue to be tried to a jury.71  This 
result is not altered by the Supreme Courts decision in Cardinal 
Chemical Co. v. Morton International Inc.,72 in which the Court 
criticized the practice of the Federal Circuit in failing to review 
lower court holdings of invalidity if, on appeal, the patent were 
held not to be infringed.73  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has 
confirmed that Cardinal is irrelevant to the present discussion.74 
 
66 Professor Borchard explores this in vivid detail. See id. at 81217. See also Van Alen 
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 43 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
67 The dismissal by the patentee is without prejudice except that a notice of dismissal 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a). 
68 See BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 81415. 
69 Protexol Corp. v. Koppers Co., 12 F.R.D. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
70 See id. 
71 See Van Alen, 43 F. Supp. at 835. 
72 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
73 See id. at 83. 
74 See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996). 
In other words, according to Cardinal, a claim for a declaratory judgment of 
invalidity is independent of patentees charge of infringement in the 
followingand only the followingway: an affirmed finding of 
noninfringement does not, without more, justify a reviewing courts refusal to 
reach the trial courts conclusion on invalidity. 
Id. 
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The leading Federal Circuit decision addressing the right to a 
jury in situations where counterclaims for declaratory judgment of 
invalidity or non-infringement are asserted is Lockwood.75  There, 
the patentee, Lockwood, instituted a patent infringement action 
against American Airlines (American), alleging that the defendant 
infringed two patents.  Lockwood sought damages, an injunction, 
and a jury.  American asserted affirmative defenses and 
counterclaims for declaratory judgments of non-infringement and 
invalidity.  After discovery, the district court granted Americans 
motion for summary judgment of non-infringement and ordered 
that the case proceed solely on Americans counterclaim for a 
declaratory judgment of invalidity.  On Americans motion, the 
district court struck Lockwoods demand that invalidity be tried to 
a jury. 
The Federal Circuit granted Lockwoods petition for a writ of 
mandamus and directed the district court to reinstate Lockwoods 
jury demand.76  The court began its analysis by observing that the 
Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury in the 
adjudication of legal as opposed to equitable rights.  To determine 
whether a particular statutory action resolves legal or equitable 
rights, courts must compare the statutory action to eighteenth 
century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the 
merger of law and equity, as well as the nature of the remedy 
sought.  The court confirmed that in eighteenth century England, as 
previously noted, allegations of patent infringement could be 
raised in both actions at law and suits in equity, depending on the 
patentees choice of remedy.  If the patentee sought damages, the 
patentee brought an action at law and the issue of validity would be 
tried to a jury.  The Federal Circuit reasoned that it could not, 
consistent with the Seventh Amendment, deny Lockwood that 
same choice merely because the validity of his patents was raised 
in a declaratory judgment counterclaim rather than as an 
 
75 In its original decision in In re Lockwood, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292, 1293 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished), the court apparently believed that Lockwoods claim for 
damages was still viable.  In large measure, this was the basis of the Federal Circuits 
decision holding that a right to a jury trial existed. 
76 See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines 
v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). 
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affirmative defense to infringement.  The court, therefore, 
concluded that Lockwood was entitled to have the factual issues 
relating to validity tried to a jury.77 
In Lockwood, the court correctly recognized that declaratory 
judgment actions (and apparently counterclaims for declaratory 
judgment) are neither legal nor equitable.  To decide the jury issue, 
therefore, courts must determine how patent validity was 
adjudicated prior to the merger of law and equity.78  In its search 
for a historical analog, the Federal Circuit stated that [i]nsofar as 
the validity of the patents is adjudicated, Americans action 
resembles nothing so much as a suit for patent infringement in 
which the affirmative defense of invalidity has been pled, and 
Lockwoods right to a jury trial must be determined 
accordingly.79  The Lockwood court continued that the primary 
difference between Americans action and the infringement suit 
that would formerly have been required for an adjudication of 
validity is that the parties positions here have been inverted, and 
such an inversion cannot operate to frustrate Lockwoods Seventh 
Amendment rights.80  Because Lockwoods infringement claim 
had been dismissed, the authors submit that the closer eighteenth 
century analog would have been an action for patent infringement 
in which damages were not sought, but invalidity was raisedby 
necessityas an affirmative defense rather than as a counterclaim.  
In that situation, Tegal holds that a right to a jury trial does not 
exist.81 
The Lockwood court recognized that under both English and 
American practice, it was the patentee who decided in the first 
 
77 In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980. 
78 Id. at 973. 
79 Id. at 974 (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at 97475 (footnote omitted). 
81 Tegal holds that the right to a jury trial where an affirmative defense of invalidity 
is raised depends on the nature of the remedy the patentee seeks. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo 
Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The Lockwood court 
distinguished Shubin v. United States Dist. Court, 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963), because 
the plaintiff in Shubin could not have sought monetary damages, whereas Lockwood 
could have and, in fact, did.  Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 977.  The court did not, however, 
explain why this made a difference since Lockwoods infringement claim had been 
dismissed.  In Tegal, the plaintiff still had a right to damages, which it intentionally 
waived. 
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instance whether a jury trial on validity would be compelled.82  
The authors do not fully understand the reference to in the first 
instance.  At common law, if the patentee chose to forego 
damages and institute a suit in equity, no jury trial was possible
regardless of the infringers defenses.  However, where the 
patentee sought damages, an action at law would follow and a jury 
would decide the validity of the patent.  The result would not have 
been altered because of declaratory judgment counterclaimsthey 
did not exist at common law.  This in the first instance language 
becomes more troubling since it appears to open the door for the 
right to a jury trial to be dictated not by the nature of the patentees 
action and the requested remedy, but by the alleged infringers 
choice to assert invalidity by a counterclaim in addition to an 
affirmative defense.  Thus, the authors submit that the crux of the 
Federal Circuits error stems from the following statement: 
We cannot, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, deny 
Lockwood that same choice merely because the validity of 
his patents comes before the court in a declaratory 
judgment action for invalidity rather than as a defense in an 
infringement suit.  Lockwood is entitled to have the factual 
questions relating to validity in this case tried to a jury as a 
matter of right.83 
The authors submit that Lockwood had no choice because his 
infringement claim had already been dismissed.  If Lockwood did 
not have a right to a jury trial in the non-inverted action, the 
inversion occasioned by the declaratory judgment action could 
not create such a right.84  Indeed, earlier in its Lockwood opinion, 
 
82 See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976 ([I]f the patentee facing past acts of infringement 
nevertheless sought only to enjoin future acts of infringement, the patentee could only 
bring a suit in equity, and the defense of invalidity ordinarily would be tried to the 
bench. (second emphasis added)); Filmon Process Corp. v. Sirica, 379 F.2d 449, 451 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that when no damages were sought, no right to a jury trial 
existed). 
83 Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976.  Accord Warner-Lambert Co. v. Purepac Pharm. Co., No. 
CIV.A.98-2749, 2001 WL 883232, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2001); Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (D.N.J. 1996). 
84 In this Article, the authors do not assert, as did the alleged infringer in Lockwood, 
that declaratory judgment actions are invariably equitable, and thus tried to the court. 
Id. at 978. 
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the Federal Circuit stated that if damages were not sought, the 
patentee had no right to a jury.  To the extent the court took the 
view that because Lockwood had initially sought damages, later 
developments could not affect his right to a jury, that reasoning is 
contradicted by Tegal, where subsequent changes in the requested 
remedy directly affected the right to a jury.  Moreover, to the 
extent the court implied that Lockwood would have had a choice if 
the validity issue had been raised only as an affirmative defense, it 
is further inconsistent with Tegal. 
The authors submit that the courts emphasis on declaratory 
judgment counterclaims in Lockwood is misplaced, especially in 
view of the courts recognition that Americans action resembled 
nothing so much as an action for patent infringement where the 
affirmative defense of invalidity had been pled.85  The courts 
reliance on the declaratory judgment counterclaims necessitated 
the carefully constructed opinion in Tegal, which distinguished 
Lockwood on this very point. 
The dissent by Judge Nies in Lockwood (in which then Chief 
Judge Archer and Judge Plager joined) explored in some detail the 
right to a jury trial in patent litigation.  While Judge Nies disagreed 
with the majority for various reasons,86 only her views regarding 
the historical test and the nature of declaratory judgment actions 
are pertinent to the present discussion.87  In her dissent, Judge Nies 
focused on the lack of monetary damages as the key to determining 
the right to a jury.  Thus, all that remains at this stage are the 
declaratory judgment counterclaim[s] for invalidity and 
unenforceability.  Neither remaining claim carries any right to 
 
85 See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974.  In its discussion, the court apparently distinguishes 
Shubin, because no claim for damages could have been brought. Id. at 977.  This, the 
authors submit, is a distinction without a difference, especially in light of Tegal. 
86 See id. at 98090 (Nies, J., dissenting).  Judge Niess discussion of the public rights 
and issue of law exceptions to a Seventh Amendment right is not addressed in this 
Article. 
87 Although the majority recognized the applicable two-part test (eighteenth century 
analog and remedy), Judge Nies criticized the majority for changing the and to or. 
See id. at 984 (Nies, J., dissenting).  The authors submit that this changeat least in 
emphasisallowed the majority to de-emphasize the lack of monetary damages and 
focus almost entirely on the purported legal nature of the invalidity defense.  Although 
this shift in emphasis may not have directly affected the majoritys decision, it made the 
ruling easier to justify. 
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damages.  The panel decision relies solely on the challenge to 
validity as the basis for the jury right.88  Because the remedy 
sought in that case was equitable, no jury trial was required.  The 
dissent then reviewed numerous decisions supporting the view that 
the failure to seek monetary damages renders the case equitable, as 
opposed to legal. 
Judge Nies further noted that the Supreme Court has held that 
the second part of the constitutional test, i.e., the requested remedy, 
is the more important part.  However, according to Judge Nies, the 
majority nonetheless (and apparently surprisingly) found that a 
right to a jury trial existed.  Thus, Judge Nies insisted that the 
majoritys analysis overlooked the fact that the patentees claim for 
infringement had been dismissed.  She then stated that a 
declaratory judgment action for invalidity is not the flip side of 
an infringement claim, because a patentee has no possibility of 
suing for a declaration of validity.89  Judge Nies views fully 
comport with those of the authors. 
After Lockwood, the Federal Circuit next addressed the right to 
a jury trial in the unpublished, non-precedential opinion, In re 
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc.90  There, the patentee, 
International Rectifier (IR), sued SGS-Thomson and sought only 
an injunction to prohibit future infringement.  SGS-Thomson 
asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaimed for declaratory 
judgments of non-infringement and invalidity.  SGS-Thomson 
demanded a jury trial on its counterclaims, which the district court 
denied.  On SGS-Thomsons petition for a writ of mandamus, the 
Federal Circuit reversed.91  Relying on its decision in Lockwood, 
the court reasoned that if SGS-Thomson had brought an action 
seeking declaratory judgments of non-infringement or invalidity, 
either SGS-Thomson or IR would have had a right to a jury trial.92  
The court observed that IRs request for injunctive relief not only 
 
88 Id. at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).  There is no dispute that the 
unenforceability claim is equitable. See generally Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting 
Co., 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
89 Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 986 (Nies, J., dissenting). 
90 In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (nonprecedential opinion). 
91 Id. at 1572. 
92 As discussed infra Part V, this proposition is not correct. 
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removed these issues from the jury, but stated that while Lockwood 
mentioned the patentees choice of remedy in its decision, the 
SGS-Thomson court based its decision on the legal nature of the 
declaratory judgment action, not the nature of the patentees 
claim.93  To the extent SGS-Thomson expands Lockwood to stand 
for the sweeping proposition that the issues of invalidity and non-
infringement are always legal, regardless of the patentees claim, 
it is wrong.94 
In fact, the Federal Circuits emphasis on the nature of the 
issue as legal or equitable is not helpful.  Professor Moore put it 
best: 
As Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissenting opinion in 
Ross [v. Borchard], fact issues are not basically legal or 
equitable.  They take on that coloration by the 
circumstances in which they arise.  Thus, in an action for 
patent infringement where the plaintiff seeks no relief but 
an injunction, the issue of whether the patent is valid and 
infringed is no more nor less an issue that a jury could 
manage than the same issue would be had the plaintiff 
sought damages.  The reason that in one case it would be 
tried to the court and in the other to the jury lies, then, not 
in the nature of the issue but in the historical development 
of separate jurisdictions.95 
 
93 SGS-Thomson, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573 (emphasis added).  This ruling is 
apparently inconsistent with SRI Intl v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 
1127 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (A patentee seeking only an injunction is not entitled to a trial 
by jury.). See also Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1061 
(N.D. Ill. 1994). 
94 See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 973 ([D]eclaratory judgment actions are, for Seventh 
Amendment purposes, only as legal or equitable in nature as the controversies on which 
they are founded.); BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 239 (stating that an action for 
declaratory judgment is as much legal as equitable.). 
95 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORES FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 38App.106[4], at 
38App.30 (3d ed. 2002).  No prohibition ever prevented a court of equity from deciding 
questions of validity and infringement. See, e.g., Silsby v. Foote, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 378 
(1858); Goodyear v. Day, 10 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.D.N.J. 1852) (Case No. 5,566); Fuller & 
Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Stephens, 59 F. 157 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1893). See generally Cochrane 
v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 783 (1876).  Only in actions at law were these issues necessarily 
tried to a jury. See, e.g., United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 205 (1936); 
Tucker v. Spalding, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 453, 455 (1871). 
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Put simply, [a]n issue does not exist in a vacuum and its 
characterization . . . may be determined only by reference to the 
claim to which it is pertinent.  If there are no legal claims in a suit 
then there are no legal issues warranting a  right to a jury trial.96  
Thus, if legal relief is not requested, a right to a jury trial does not 
exist, regardless of counterclaims for invalidity or non-
infringement. 
V. IN A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION FOR INVALIDITY OR 
NON-INFRINGEMENT, THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IS DICTATED BY 
THE PATENTEES CHOICE OF REMEDY 
Declaratory judgment actions, unknown at common law, are a 
recent procedural development that facilitate the adjudication of 
controversies.97  As explained by Professor Borchard, patentees 
could threaten alleged infringers with infringement actions but 
never institute suit, thereby denying the accused infringer its day in 
court.98  The Declaratory Judgment Act (hereinafter the Act),99 
passed in 1934, changed this practice and provided the alleged 
infringer with a procedure to test the validity and infringement of 
the asserted patent.100  Indeed, the Act is entitled Creation of 
remedy.101  As such, it is clear that the Act did not extend the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Instead it simply provided a 
procedure for, inter alia, the accused infringer to institute suit. 
 
96 Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). See 
also Gardo Mfg. Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (factual 
disputes arising in an equitable claim are not decided by a jury). 
97 Part of the difficulty in analyzing suits under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2201, versus possible historical analogs in eighteenth century England is that a 
mere four years after the Act was passed, the merger of law and equity occurred.  Thus, 
case law under the Act regarding actions at law and suits in equity was still developing 
when the merger took place, further compounding an already confusing area of law.  It 
has been observed that in that four-year period every reported action for a declaration of 
patent invalidity was instituted in a court of equity. See Coggio & Bresnick, supra note 
17, at 271 n.100. 
98 See BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 803; see also Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp. 
779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). 
99 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). 
100 See BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 80406. 
101 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
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In Lockwood, the Federal Circuit suggested that a declaratory 
judgment action is merely the inversion of an action for patent 
infringement and that such an inversion cannot operate to 
frustrate Lockwoods Seventh Amendment rights.102 
Under Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a right 
to a jury trial exists if that right would have existed in the kind of 
action in which the pertinent issue would have been decided if a 
declaratory judgment procedure did not exist.  As such, 
declaratory judgment actions are, for Seventh Amendment 
purposes, only as legal or equitable as the controversies on which 
they are founded.103  The same is true in patent infringement 
actions.  As a result, reference to the questions of patent validity or 
infringement as legal or equitable is not helpful in identifying 
the decision maker. 
Because the issues of validity and infringement in declaratory 
judgment actions are neither legal nor equitable, the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff must await the defendants answer and 
counterclaims before knowing whether a right to a jury trial 
exists.104  The leading treatises concur; for example, Professors 
Wright and Miller state: 
An action for a declaratory judgment with regard to patents 
or copyrights will give rise to a right to a trial by jury if 
there would have been such a right in the coercive action 
that otherwise would have been required.  Although there 
may be no right to a jury in the rare cases in which all that 
is sought is a declaration that the defendants patent is 
invalid or not infringed, if the defendant counterclaims and 
asks for damages for infringement of the patent, either 
 
102 In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines v. 
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). 
103 Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 973. See also 8 MOORE, supra note 95, § 38App.106[1], at 
38App.24. 
104 As Professor Moore emphasizes: The basic nature of the issue in patent litigation 
was also dependent upon the patentees choice of remedy: an action by the patentee 
under . . . former 35 U.S.C. § 70 for an injunction and damages presented equitable 
issues.  8 MOORE, supra note 95, § 38App.106[1], at 38App.22.  The nature of the 
issue, e.g., whether the patent-in-suit is valid or invalid, does not change depending on 
the relief sought. 
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alone or in addition to other relief, there is a right to jury 
trial on the legal demands in the counterclaim.105 
Thus, the right to a jury trial rests with the patentee.  In addition, 
the issues of validity and infringement raised in the declaratory 
judgment complaint are no more legal or equitable than the 
same issues when raised by an infringer as an affirmative defense 
in an action for patent infringement.  In both instances, the trier of 
fact is dictated by the patentees choice of remedy.  As Professor 
Moore explains: 
These general principles applied where the alleged 
infringer took the initiative and sought declaratory relief 
against the patentee, and the patentee counterclaimed.  The 
nature of the patentees counterclaim, whether legal or 
equitable, would determine the basic nature of the issue in 
the case.106 
The case law agrees.  For example, General Motors Corp. v. 
California Research Corp107 was a declaratory judgment action for 
invalidity and non-infringement.  Defendant interposed a 
counterclaim for infringement, sought damages and requested a 
jury trial.  Plaintiff moved to strike, which was denied.  The court 
noted that prior to the Act, infringement actions could only be 
litigated at the instance of the patentee and, at his option, could be 
by legal action or in equity.108  Because the patentee had sought 
damages, a right to jury trial existed.  In contrast, where no 
counterclaim for damages is interposed, the case must be tried to 
the court.109 
 
105 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
CIVIL 2D § 2312, at 107 (1994) (citations omitted). 
106 See 8 MOORE, supra note 95, § 38App.106[1] at App. 22 (emphasis added). See also 
GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HASEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 105, at 
457 (2d ed. 1994) (footnotes omitted) (In the usual reversed parties case, this [jury trial] 
inquiry would require application of the modified historical test for the right to jury trial 
to the action that the declaratory judgment defendant would have brought had not the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff filed first.). 
107 9 F.R.D. 565 (D. Del. 1949). 
108 Id. at 566 (emphasis added). 
109 See Inland Steel Prods. Co. v. MPH Mfg. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 238, 245 (N.D. Ill. 1959) 
([P]rior to the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . , the patentee had the 
choice of suing at law or in equity; his choice of remedy still controls the nature of his 
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Quite possibly, however, the most informative decision did not 
involve patents at all.  In Beacon Theatres v. Westover,110 plaintiff 
instituted suit seeking a declaration that its conduct did not violate 
the antitrust laws and an injunction preventing defendant Beacon 
from instituting an antitrust action.  Beacon filed a counterclaim 
for treble damages and demanded a jury trial.111 The Court held 
that since the counterclaim for treble damages would have entitled 
Beacon to a jury trial if it had brought the action at law, Beacon 
cannot be deprived of that right merely because [plaintiff] took 
advantage of the availability of declaratory relief to sue Beacon 
first.112 As Justice Stewart stated in his dissent, [i]f the complaint 
had been answered simply by a general denial, therefore, the issues 
would under traditional principles have been triable as a 
proceeding in equity.113  Indeed, in essentially the last sentence of 
the dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart specifically addressed the 
right to a jury in patent declaratory judgment actions.  He 
instructed: 
Determination of whether a claim stated by the complaint is 
triable by the court or by a jury will normally not be 
dependent upon the legal or equitable character of the 
counterclaim.  There are situations, however, such as a case 
 
action.); Hall v. Kish, 11 F.R.D. 292, 293 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Brody v. Kafka, 73 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Ryan Distrib. Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377, 
379 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (There are numerous cases holding that the patent holder has his 
election as to the form of action and therefore the right to a jury trial.). But see 
Minnesota Auto., Inc. v. Stromberg Hydraulic Brake & Coupling Co., 167 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 165, 166 (D. Minn. 1970) (ordering a jury trial in a patent declaratory judgment 
action even though no claim for damages was asserted; according to the court, the factual 
issues required a jury trial, even though the basic issues were equitable). 
110 359 U.S. 500 (1959).  For further discussion of the Beacon Theatre decision, see 
John C. McCoid II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon 
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1967); Martin H. Redish, Seventh 
Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 
70 NW. U. L. REV. 486 (1975). 
111 Beacon Theaters, 359 U.S. at 503. 
112 Id. at 504. See also Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the 
Use of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part I), 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 609, 618 (1976) (Under 
Beacon Theatres, the right to jury trial depends upon the legal or equitable nature of the 
counterclaim.).  Ropski notes that Beacon Theaters was foreshadowed by Ryan Distrib. 
Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943), a declaratory judgment action in which 
the defendant-patentee counterclaimed for damages.  There, a right to a jury trial existed. 
113 Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 512 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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in which the plaintiff seeks a declaration of invalidity or 
noninfringement of a patent, in which the relief sought by 
the counterclaim will determine the nature of the entire 
case.114 
The authors fully agree with Justice Stewarts observations, which 
were not affected by the majority opinion.  So does Chief Judge 
Robinson of the District of Delaware.  In Rhenalu v. Alcoa, Inc.,115 
plaintiff Rhenalu filed a declaratory judgment action seeking 
rulings of invalidity and non-infringement of defendant Alcoas 
patent, as well as a claim for tortuous interference.  Alcoa filed a 
counterclaim for infringement and requested both damages and an 
injunction.116  The parties later stipulated that all requests for 
monetary damages were withdrawn and that no monetary relief 
(including damages) will be sought in this litigation.117 The case 
was tried to a jury and the patent was held valid and infringed.  
Based upon the then recently-decided Tegal case, plaintiff moved 
to vacate the judgment based on the jury verdict.  In a one-page 
order the court granted the motion stating: Pursuant to the Federal 
Circuits decision in Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.,  
given that defendant-patentee voluntarily withdrew its claim for 
damages it also waived its right to a jury trial.118 The court rested 
the right to a jury trial on the patentees counterclaim.  Lacking a 
counterclaim for damages, the patentee had no right to have the 
infringement or validity of the patent decided by a jury.  Thus, 
even in a declaratory judgment action the right to a jury trial 
depends on the remedy selected by the patentee. 
While this conclusion is consistent with Tegal, it conflicts with 
Lockwood.  The declaratory judgment action in Rhenalu, which 
seeks a ruling of invalidity, is the functional equivalent of the 
counterclaim for invalidity in Lockwood.  If Tegal, at least 
according to the Delaware court, dictates that the patentee in 
Rhenalu had no right to a jury trial, then the patentee in Lockwood 
equally had no such right. 
 
114 Id. at 519 n.13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
115 No. Civ. A. 99-301, 2000 WL 1868178 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2000). 
116 Id. at *1. 
117 Id. at *1 n.1. 
118 Order, September 28, 2001 (citation omitted) (unpublished). 
4-COGGIO FORMAT 12/12/02  4:28 PM 
230 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:205 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the Federal Circuits decision in Tegal, its earlier 
decisions in Lockwood and SGS-Thomson should, at a minimum, 
be revisited.  Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with the views 
expressed by the authors, hopefully this Article will spur 
discussion that will lead to that reevaluation. 
 
